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THE NEW INTERMEDIARY ON THE BLOCK: FUNDING
PORTALS UNDER THE CROWDFUND ACT
JOAN MACLEOD HEMINWAY*
ABSTRACT

The CROWDFUND Act, part of the JOBS Act signed into law in April
2012, provides for a new registered securities intermediary known as a funding
portal. Funding portals or registered brokers must participate in crowdfunded
offerings of securities conducted in accordance with the new federal offering
registration exemption created in the CROWDFUND Act. Although regulations
are forthcoming that will further illuminate the structure and function of funding
portals, the CROWDFUND Act itself offers some insights into the role of
funding portals in securities crowdfunding and allows for preliminary
observations about legal issues inherent in funding portal status. This paper
makes those observations and highlights areas of potential regulatory concern
after labeling funding portals using existing terminology and locating funding
portals in recognized taxonomies of securities intermediaries.
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INTRODUCTION

There are transactional intermediaries, and there are transactional
intermediaries. Some merely serve simple, ministerial agency functions in
transactions (e.g., holding and conveying goods or money), while others also
serve additional purposes in facilitating transactions (e.g., conveying information
relating to the transaction). Intermediaries have the capacity, depending on their
role, to add both costs and benefits to transactions. They sometimes engage with
transaction participants on a voluntary basis, sometimes as obligated by contract,
and sometimes as mandated by law. In an increasingly electronic and global
world, few transactions occur without intermediation of some kind. In short,
intermediaries matter.'
Intermediaries are common in corporate finance and securities
transactions-especially in public securities transactions and markets. 2 These
intermediaries may be deemed to include standard internal governance actors
(e.g., the board of directors). More commonly, however, the term is reserved for
use in describing transaction participants external to the issuer and investors,
including public accountants, legal counsel, investment banks (acting as financial
advisors, securities underwriters, financial analysts, and valuation experts),
valuation firms, rating agencies, mutual fund managers, and others. Different
intermediaries operate in different kinds of financial transactions.
This paper focuses on a new, statutorily ordained and mandated
intermediary in certain securities offerings made through the Internet. Under
Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the "1933 Act"), 4 offers and
sales of securities must be registered, absent an exemption. Title III of the

Jonathan M. Barnett, Intermediaries Revisited: Is Efficient Certification Consistent with Profit
Maximization?, 37 IOWA J. CORP. L. 475, 476 (2012) ("Intermediaries are the linchpin in any
market economy characterized by enormous volumes of transactions conducted among anonymous
participants that have limited capacities to directly evaluate each other's products and services.").
2 See id. at 483-84 (describing various intermediaries and intermediations in corporate finance
and securities transactions); John L. Orcutt, Improving the Efficiency of the Angel FinanceMarket:
A Proposalto Expand the IntermediaryRole of Finders in the Private Capital Raising Setting, 37
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 861, 866 (2005) ("[A] long and impressive list of intermediaries has developed to
improve the efficiency of the public equity market. These intermediaries . . . include such market
fixtures as investment banks, research analysts, public auditors, and mutual fund managers"
(footnote omitted)).
3 See Barnett, supra note 1, at 484; Orcutt, supra note 2, at 866.
4 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2012).
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Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (typically referred to as the "JOBS Act"),
known as the Capital Raising Online While Deterring Fraud and Unethical NonDisclosure Act (the "CROWDFUND Act"),5 includes a new transactional
exemption from registration for crowdfunded offers and sales of securities. 6
Under that exemption, offers and sales must be made through registered brokers
or "funding portals," a new form of transactional intermediary.
We do not know much about this new form of intermediary based on the
CROWDFUND Act. The U.S. Congress scripted out a few key characteristics
and obligations in the text of the statute, and left the rest to Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC") rulemaking. Congress provided for the issuance
of these rules "not later than 270 days" after the date the CROWDFUND Act was
enacted,' and they are, at this writing, overdue.
In the absence of these rules, this paper seeks to identify and comment on
the intermediary status of funding portals based on the attributes of crowdfunding
and the congressional mandates in the CROWDFUND Act. A more complete
understanding of the roles of various forms of intermediary-especially those
operating in securities markets-is necessary as a foundation to this depiction.
Accordingly, the paper starts by defining the concept of an intermediary and
describing a number of potentially useful taxonomies of intermediaries that
operate in securities offerings and markets. The paper then situates funding
portals within these definitions and taxonomies using the text of the substantive
provisions drafted by the Congress, the history and development of crowdfunding
before passage of the CROWDFUND Act, the impetus for the CROWDFUND
Act in general, and the genesis of the funding portal requirement in particular.
The paper then concludes by offering some preliminary observations about
funding portals as a new form of transactional intermediary in U.S. securities
regulation.

I. DEFINING

AND CATEGORIZING INTERMEDIARIES

In common parlance, we often use the word "intermediary" to describe a
middleman, a conduit, or a go-between. These everyday usages are good
descriptors, consistent with general dictionary definitions and thesaurus entries.9
§§ 301-305 (2012).
Id. § 302(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d(6) (2012)).
7 Id. (requiring that "the transaction is conducted through a broker or funding portal that complies
with the requirements of section 4A(a)").
Id. § 302(c).
9 See, e.g., Intermediary Definition, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/
intermediary (last visited Mar. 19, 2013) (defining an intermediary as "an intermediate agent or
agency; a go-between or mediator," "a medium or means," or "an intermediate form or stage");
Intermediary Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
intermediary (last visited Mar. 19, 2013) (defining an intermediary as a "mediator," "go-between,"
5 Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306,
6
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Similarly, Black's Law Dictionary defines an intermediary as "[a] mediator or gobetween; ....
Cf. FINDER."10 The various general and legal definitions of an
intermediary describe a number of different types of role-e.g., active, passive,
required, voluntary-and can apply to a number of different settings.
Intermediaries typically exist in a transaction as a means of increasing its
overall efficiency; the benefits an intermediary offers to transaction participants
or the markets in which they operate are expected to exceed the aggregate costs
of their participation. In financial transactions, intermediaries often serve to
address or balance informational asymmetries that may negatively impact the
market in which those transactions occur. They do this in various ways,
depending on the circumstances in which the intermediation occurs. For example,
intermediaries may supply, construe, or confirm information, or they may serve a
signaling function.
Commentators classify securities transaction intermediaries based on
common attributes that have salience for different legal analyses. These
classifications are useful for communicating intermediary characteristics,
developing and testing theory, and assessing the consonance of doctrine with
underlying policy. The classification of an intermediary may determine the nature
and extent of the duties an intermediary has and the persons to whom those duties
are owed. Applicable duties may include care, loyalty, disclosure (or candor),
good faith, reasonable investigation, or confidentiality. The classification of an
intermediary also interacts with agency theory and transaction cost theory, as well
as theoretical principles from behavioral finance, and interrelates with policies
important to securities regulation, including investor protection, the maintenance
of market integrity, and the promotion of capital formation.
The remainder of this Part describes principal taxonomies of
intermediaries represented in existing corporate finance literature produced by
legal scholars. These taxonomies overlap in coverage-some categories are
defined by similar, analogous, or complementary attributes, and intermediaries
often fit into more than one category. Moreover, commentators define categories
to suit the applicable context. In general, however, the taxonomies emphasize
different aspects of the roles intermediaries most frequently play in securities
offerings and markets.

"medium," "means," or "an intermediate form, product, or stage" and listing as synonyms "broker,
buffer, conciliator, go-between, honest broker, interceder, intercessor, mediator, intermediate,
interposer,
middleman,
peacemaker");
Intermediary
Synonyms,
TiESAURUS.COM,
http://thesaurus.com/browse/intermediary (last visited Mar. 19, 2013) (listing the following as
synonyms for "intermediary": "agent, broker, channel, connection, cutout, delegate, emissary,
entrepreneur, fixer, go-between, influence, instrument, interagent, interceder, intercessor,
intermediate, mediator, medium, middle person, negotiator, organ, vehicle").
10 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 820 (7th ed.
1999).
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Securities Intermediary ClassificationsBased on FunctionalRoles

It is possible, at a fundamental level, to organize intermediaries by their
transactional function. Both the regulatory scheme and academic literature (in and
outside law) have characterized intermediaries in securities transactions in this
manner. This type of taxonomy may be helpful in the study of, for example, the
relative quality of intermediary performance under certain conditions, conflicting
interests, agency problems, and other matters emanating from or involving the
actual tasks that the intermediary performs in its role." I identify and briefly
describe three principal functional classifications of securities in this Subpart:
distributional conduits,
information intermediaries,
and collectivizing
intermediaries.
1. Distributional Conduits
In a simple sale of securities, value (cash, another security, or other
property) is exchanged for a security. 1 2 Securities regulation offers a number of
salient examples of intermediaries who participate in the distribution channel for
securities, acting as conduits for either the securities being sold or the value being
transferred in exchange. These include brokers, firm commitment underwriters in
securities offerings, indenture trustees, and transfer agents. These terms are
defined in and under federal securities law.
* A "broker" is "any person engaged in the business of effecting transactions
in securities for the account of others."13
* An "underwriter" in the securities offering context generally is "any person
who has purchased from an issuer with a view to, or offers or sells for an
issuer in connection with, the distribution of any security, or participates
or has a direct or indirect participation in any such undertaking, or
participates or has a participation in the direct or indirect underwriting of
any such undertaking ....

See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi, A Framework for the Regulation of Securities Market
Intermediaries, I BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 45, 81 (2004) [hereinafter, "Choi I"] (noting that securities
market intermediaries "face separate financing, conflicts of interest, and agency control
problems.").
12 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(3) (2012) (defining "sale" as "every contract of sale or disposition of a
security or interest in a security, for value").
13 Id. § 78c(a)(4); see also C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding
and the FederalSecurities Laws,
2012 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 1, 63 [hereinafter "Bradford I"] ("The receipt or transmission of funds
or securities is another criterion considered in determining whether someone is a broker.").
14
15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1 1); see also Stephen J. Choi, The Unfounded Fear of Regulation S:
Empirical Evidence on Offshore Securities Offerings, 50 DUKE L.J. 663, 694 n. 106 (2000)
[hereinafter "Choi II"] ("[U]nderwriters in a firm commitment offering serve a . . . conduit
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* A "debt indenture trustee" includes "each trustee under the indenture to be

qualified, and each successor trustee."15 Further, "trustees are
intermediaries between the borrowers and the lenders, and are charged
with certain obligations under the indentures with collecting the funds
from the borrower, distributing those funds to the individual security
holders and, in general, administering the underlying loan."1 6
* A "transfer agent" is "any person who engages on behalf of an issuer of
securities or on behalf of itself as an issuer of securities in (A)
countersigning such securities upon issuance; (B) monitoring the issuance
of such securities with a view to preventing unauthorized issuance, a
function commonly performed by a person called a registrar; (C)
registering the transfer of such securities; (D) exchanging or converting
such securities; or (E) transferring record ownership of securities by
bookkeeping entry without physical issuance of securities certificates."
Other similar roles exist in connection with, for example, tender and
exchange offers. The distributional conduits used in tender offers are securities
depositories" (also commonly labeled tender agents or paying agents), and those
used in exchange offers are referred to as exchange agents. 9 Each accepts
tendered securities and distributes consideration in return. 2 0
function for public offerings. In a firm commitment offering, underwriters purchase the securities
from the issuer and then attempt to resell the securities into the public market.").
"5 15 U.S.C. § 77ccc(10).
16 Joseph R. Prochaska, Suggested Reading: Corporate Trust Administration and Management,
19 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 34 (June 2000) (reviewing ROBERT I. LANDAU & JOHN E. KRUEGER,
CORPORATE TRUST ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT (5th ed. 1998)); see also J. Maxwell
Tucker, The Clash of Successor Liability Principles, Reorganization Law, and the Just Demand
that ReliefBe Afforded Unknown and Unknowable Claimants, 12 BANKR. DEV. J. 1, 92 (1995).
1

15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(25).

See 17 C.F.R. § 270.17f-4(c)(6) (2013). Functionally, a securities depository
(i) acts as a custodian of securities in connection with a system for the central
handling of securities whereby all securities of a particular class or series of any
issuer deposited within the system are treated as fungible and may be
transferred, loaned, or pledged by bookkeeping entry without physical delivery
of securities certificates, or (ii) otherwise permits or facilitates the settlement of
securities transactions or the hypothecation or lending of securities without
physical delivery of securities certificates.
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(23)(A). The Depository Trust Company, now part of The Depository Trust &
Clearing Corporation, is the national securities depository in the United States. See About DTCC:
The Depository Trust Company (DTC), http://www.dtcc.com/about/subs/dtc.php; see also Onnig
H. Dombalagian, Self and Self-Regulation: Resolving the SRO Identity Crisis, I BROOK. J. CORP.
FIN. & COM. L. 317, 320 n. 12 (2007); Craig Pirrong, Financial Exchanges: Competition and
Vertical Integration in FinancialExchanges, 7 COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L 90, 99-100 (2011).
19 See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §240.17Ad-14(c).
20 id.
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Distributional conduits often raise classic agency law issues (e.g.,
fiduciary duty concerns and third-party liability considerations), although the
actual application of agency law to those issues may be limited, tailored, or
enhanced by applicable law or regulation. For example, a debt indenture trustee's
duties to debt holders are limited to contractual duties in the absence of a default
* 21
on the debt obligation.
2. Information Intermediaries
In a 2004 article in the Berkeley Business Law Journal,Professor Stephen
Choi identifies a number of securities market intermediaries that serve as
information intermediaries-intermediaries that provide or interpret information
in connection with transactions in securities.2 2 As examples of this kind of
intermediary, Professor Choi cites to auditors, analysts, proxy advisors, and
23
securities underwriters.

Auditors provide certification and verification of a company's
financial statements. Analysts give the investing public
information on the value of particular investments. Proxy
advisors, such as Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), give
primarily institutional investors information on how to vote their
proxies. Underwriters in a public offering work, at least in part, to
certify the quality of the offering.2 4
Investment advisors would also fit into this category,2 5 as would, for
example, placement agents in a private placement offering.26

21

§ 77ooo(a)(1) ("The indenture to be qualified shall automatically be deemed (unless it is

expressly provided therein that any such provision is excluded) to provide that, prior to default (as
such term is defined in such indenture)-(1) the indenture trustee shall not be liable except for the
performance of such duties as are specifically set out in such indenture").
22 See Choi 1, supra note 11, at 46-47 (Professor Choi does not label these intermediaries as
"information intermediaries." I use this label in this paper to simplify references.); Ronald J.
Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REv. 549, 618
(1984) (referring to underwriters as, among other things, "an information ... intermediary").
23 Choi, supra note 11, at 47; see also Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, How To Fix Wall Street: A
Voucher Financing Proposalfor Securities Intermediaries, 113 YALE L.J. 269, 283-98 (2003)
(citing to and describing the informational roles of securities analysts, auditors, and proxy advisory
services).
24 Choi 1, supra note 11, at 47.
25 See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (defining an investment advisor as a person who or which "for
compensation, engages in the business of advising others, either directly or through publications or
writings, as to the value of securities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling
securities [or who, or which] for compensation and as part of a regular business, issues or
promulgates analyses or reports concerning securities").
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Information intermediaries may have a number of different roles in
securities transactions. They may serve as finders (agents who identify potential
investors or partners in the transaction) 27 or marketers (agents who promote the
transaction to potential participants). 2 8 These intermediaries, like other types of
intermediaries in securities transactions and markets, are often charged with
serving an investor protection purpose: "[i]ntermediary institutions play a key
role in . . . increasing investor welfare."2 9

A certification intermediary is a specific type of information intermediary
that also serves as a reputational intermediary.3 0 Certification intermediaries
provide information to putative and actual market participants in the form of
"reliable evaluation and monitoring services." Certification intermediaries often
are referred to as "gatekeepers." 3 2 Key examples of these kinds of intermediaries
in securities transactions include (in addition to underwriters in public offerings,
as noted above3 3) rating agencies, public accountants, and lawyers. 34

See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of
PredatoryLending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2072 n.161 (2007) ("The placement agent will
normally conduct due diligence of some sort before the offering and will obtain comfort letters
from lawyers and accountants.").
27 See, e.g., Orcutt, supra note 2, at 901-02 (evaluating private placement finders as possible
broker-dealers); John Polanin, Jr., The "Finder's" Exception from Federal Broker-Dealer
Registration,40 CATH. U. L. REV. 787, 822 (1991) (describing finders that arrange trades between
buyers and sellers of securities as "perhaps at the core of broker-dealer activity").
28 See, e.g., Joseph K. Leahy, The IrrepressibleMyths of BarChris, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 411, 47475 (2012) (noting an underwriter's roles as a marketer and "protector of the investors via due
diligence"); Helen S. Scott, Resurrecting Indemnification: Contribution Clauses in Underwriting
Agreements, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 223, 235 (1986) (noting "the dual function of the underwriters, as
both evaluators and marketers, in the enterprise of securities distribution.").
29 Choi I, supra note 11, at 46-47.
30 See infra text accompanying note 42.
31 Barnett, supra note 1, at 476.
32 See, e.g., id. n.1 (identifying two kinds of gatekeeper: "(i) entities that certify as to the quality
of a certified product, service, or entity; and (ii) entities that both perform a certification function
and can restrict access to the market."); John C. Coffee, Jr., UnderstandingEnron: "It'sAbout the
Gatekeepers, Stupid," 57 Bus. LAW. 1403, 1405 (2002) ("Inherently, gatekeepers are reputational
intermediaries who provide verification and certification services to investors."); Arthur B. Laby,
Differentiating Gatekeepers, 1 BROOK. J. CORP., FIN. & COM. L. 119, 122 (2006) ("One common
definition of gatekeeper is a reputational intermediary who provides verification or certification
services to investors."); Leahy, supra note 28, at 418 ("A gatekeeper's job is to deter wrongdoing
by the issuer. A reputational intermediary does this by performing verification or certification
services for investors" (footnote omitted)).
33 See supra text accompanying note 24 ("Underwriters in a public offering work, at least in part,
to certify the quality of the offering."); see also Leahy, supra note 28, at 418 ("Section 11 forces an
underwriter to play the role of 'gatekeeper' or 'reputational intermediary."').
34 See Barnett, supra note 1, at 477-78.
26
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3. Collectivizing Intermediaries
Professor Choi also notes that institutional investors, including mutual
funds, serve investor interests by "collectivizing the actions of shareholders."3 5
Specifically, he observes that "[i]nstitutional investors, including mutual funds,
help to aggregate the interests of a large number of smaller, individual investors. .
. . Mutual funds help collectivize investment research (and decisionmaking) for
investors, among other services." In a separate article published in 2003,
Professor Choi and Professor Jill Fisch noted that "[i]ndividual shareholders may
also act as collectivizing intermediaries."3 6 In addition, they noted that aspects of
the activities of proxy advisors serve a collectivizing function, since they "supply
voting guidance and, in some cases, facilitate shareholder activism through the
voting process." Debt indenture trustees may also be seen as collectivizing
intermediaries for a number of reasons (including, for example, when bringing
actions on behalf of debt investors under an indenture's no action clause).38
The delegation or aggregation of individual responsibilities or rights in a
single individual or entity may have benefits and detriments. Collectivizing
securities intermediaries may resolve collective action problems. For example,
they may act as a central repository for, and source of, information important to
investors as a group. They also may monitor investments, or serve as an agent for
exercising investors' rights. But, they may not always act in the manner, or with
the care, investors expect. Moreover, it is unlikely that they will be able to
adequately represent the rights of all investors, since investors may have different
interests and objectives. Confrontations over these kinds of differences present
challenges to collectivizing intermediation.
B. ReputationalIntermediaries
Intermediaries can also be identified by the effect that they have on the
behavior of market participants. In this type of classification, it is not so much
what you do as an intermediary, but rather who you are that matters.
Intermediaries who lend the value of their credibility and honesty to market
transactions are frequently labeled "reputational intermediaries."
[L]Ilegal scholars that use economically-informed approaches have
generally depicted the reputational intermediary as a trustworthy

36

Choi 1, supra note 11, at 47.
Choi & Fisch, supra note 23, at 298.

37

Id. at 272.

35

See, e.g., Marcel Kahan, Rethinking CorporateBonds: The Trade-Off Between Individual and
Collective Rights, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1040, 1049-52 (2002) (explaining the operation of no-action
clauses).
38
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player who moderates informational asymmetries that would
otherwise distort or prevent efficient exchange. This
characterization has been applied extensively in capital markets
scholarship to attribute reputational functions to lawyers, auditors,
underwriters, and stock exchanges.3 9
The participation of reputational intermediaries in a transaction, as well as
the perceived status of the individual intermediaries involved in any particular
transaction, acts as a signaling device to the market, enhancing trust in the
transaction. The trust in reputational intermediaries may be created by their
established role in a transaction (as created by statute, regulation, or entrenched
norm). Trust also may be earned through recurrent, consistent, positive market
participation that is valued by investors or other market participants. 4 0 This trust
enables others to engage in the transaction without undertaking as much
individual research and evaluation, decreasing their transaction costs. 4 1
Reputational intermediaries, broadly defined, include certification
intermediaries (which are functionally information intermediaries). As a result,
reputational intermediaries are often denominated "gatekeepers." 4 2 In providing a
certification function, gatekeepers monitor, control, and centralize informational
and quality concerns, discouraging and even preventing the occurrence of some
fraud or other transactional frictions (at least in theory). 43 They also may serve a
collectivizing function.

Barnett, supra note 1, at 481 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 482 (noting that the capacity of a reputational intermediary "derives from its repeatplayer status: an established intermediary has known incentives to preserve its reputational capital
by acting diligently and honestly and can therefore provide a credible proxy on behalf of a seller
that cannot adequately commit to any assertion of quality by recourse to reputation, contract or
some combination thereof.").
41 See Leahy, supra note 28, at 418. Some observers have described the operation and effects of
this element of trust as a heuristic (cognitive short-cut). E.g., Anita Anand & Lewis Johnson, Are
UnderwritersEssential? Empirical Evidence on Non Book-Built Offerings, 3 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 1,
27 (2006) (noting evidence that investors in public offerings apply "a heuristic that the underwriter
lowers the risk of the offering because of the information, credibility and verification functions that
it provides."); Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, BehavioralEconomics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 13 (2003) ("Rather than read a voluminous prospectus, an investor may rely simply on the
identity of the managing underwriters, applying a heuristic that well-known underwriters often
equate to lower risk offerings.").
42 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
43 See, e.g., Assaf Hamdani, Gatekeeper Liability, 77 S. CAL. L. REv. 53, 113 (2003) ("Some
capital-market participants, especially auditors and underwriters, serve as 'reputational
intermediaries' on behalf of issuers. Those gatekeepers arguably have nonlegal incentives to
ensure that their clients do not commit fraud." (footnote omitted)); Mark Klock, Two Possible
Answers to the Enron Experience: Will It Be Regulation of Fortune Tellers or Rebirth of
Secondary Liability?, 28 IOWA J. CORP. L. 69, 85 (2002) (noting that "[a]ccountants are
reputational intermediaries. When they audit and approve financial statements, they also rent out
40
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Securities markets have long employed "gatekeepers" independent professionals who pledge their reputational capital to protect the interests of dispersed investors who cannot easily
take collective action. The clearest examples of such reputational
intermediaries are auditors and securities analysts, who verify or
assess corporate disclosures in order to advise investors in
different ways. 44
Although Professor Coffee only references "independent professionals"
in the preceding quotation, other scholars have noted that, as gatekeepers,
reputational intermediaries may be independent of transaction principals or
dependent on them. The distinction focuses specifically on "whether, as a
normative matter, the gatekeeper is meant to be independent of the client, acting
as a neutral umpire, or whether the gatekeeper is meant to be dependent on the
client, charged with promoting the client's ends in a fiduciary or similar
capacity."4 5 Under this independent/dependent taxonomy, public company
auditors exemplify independent gatekeepers,4 6 legal counsel represent dependent
gatekeepers,4 7 and securities underwriters may have attributes of both
independent and dependent gatekeepers. 48 This categorization may signify
identifiable behavioral attributes and indicate gatekeeping effectiveness.4
"Recent scholarship suggests that independent gatekeepers, like auditors, are
better positioned to protect investors than dependent gatekeepers, like the issuer's
counsel."5 0

II.

FUNDING PORTALS AS CROWDFUNDING INTERMEDIARIES

Having identified these different categories of intermediaries, it is now
possible to label CROWDFUND Act funding portals in accordance with the

their reputations for conducting a careful audit that can catch some fraud and discourage attempts
at fraud, and for painting a tolerably accurate picture of a company's performance."); Leahy, supra
note 28, at 418 ("A gatekeeper's job is to deter wrongdoing by the issuer.").
44 John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant
Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 302 (2004).
45 Laby, supra note 32, at 120.
46 See id. at 124 ("The auditor of a public company should be the archetypal independent
gatekeeper.").
47 See id. at 128 ("A prime example of a dependent gatekeeper is the lawyer.").
48 See id. at 121 ("Gatekeepers are categorized as independent or dependent based on which
features should predominate, recognizing that this split is not clear-cut and some gatekeepers, such
as underwriters, share characteristics of both."); id. at 132-34 (describing the independent and
dependent gatekeeper features of underwriters). But see Leahy, supra note 28, at 418 ("[T]here
should be little doubt that (most) underwriters are dependent gatekeepers.").
49 See id.
at 162-63.
50 Leahy, supra note 28, at 418.
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various intermediary types. To do that, it is important to understand the genesis
and nature of funding portals. This understanding is best achieved by describing
crowdfunding in the years preceding the CROWDFUND Act and the role of
crowdfunding websites in crowdfunded offerings. With this background in mind,
funding portals can be described and preliminarily analyzed.
A. Some BackgroundInformation Necessary to a Contextual
UnderstandingofFundingPortals
Funding portals are a product of both the crowdfunding movement as it
existed-and thrived-before adoption of the CROWDFUND Act in April 2012
and the regulatory process that these early-stage crowdfunding efforts spawned.
For a number of years, crowdfunding developed organically as a way to fund
ventures and projects.5 ' Typically (and in its most common usage), the term
"crowdfunding" is used to describe the use of the Internet in raising funds from
the crowd-soliciting and obtaining financial capital from the public masses, not
merely institutional, professional, habitual, or other select backers. 52
Crowdfunding may involve the offer and sale of securities, implicating federal
and state securities laws. 3 The crowdfunding of financial interests through the
offer and sale of instruments that constitute securities is often referred to as
"crowdfund investing." When Congress took up the task of specifically
deregulating crowdfund investing two years ago, it was not writing on a blank
slate.54 The crowdfunding train had left the station and was chugging along the

KEVIN LAWTON & DAN MAROM, THE CROWDFUNDING REVOLUTION 47-53 (2013)
Id. at ix ("Crowdfunding describes the collective cooperation, attention, and trust by people
who network and pool their money and other resources together, usually via the Internet, to
support efforts initiated by other people or organizations." (citing to Wikipedia)); THOMAS
ELLIOTT YOUNG, THE EVERYTHING GUIDE TO CROWDFUNDING 49 (2013) ("Crowdfunding literally
means getting a lot of people, 'the crowd,' to help fund projects, missions, and causes. ... [T]he
connectedness of the Internet and social media has allowed crowdfunding to become a major
trend.").
53 See, e.g., Joan MacLeod Heminway & Shelden Ryan Hoffman, Proceed at Your Peril:
Crowdfunding and the Securities Act of 1933, 78 TENN. L. REV. 879, 882 (2011) ("It is clear that
some but not all manifestations of the crowdfunding model result in the offer and sale of interests
that are securities under the Securities Act of 1933 .... ).
54 To many, the concept that Congress was focused on deregulating crowdfund investing in
taking up the statutory and regulatory changes eventually enacted and provided for in the
CROWDFUND Act is unclear (and even seemingly paradoxical). But deregulation is, in fact, the
purpose and effect of the additional regulation introduced in the CROWDFUND Act (and the
JOBS Act as a whole). Specifically, the CROWDFUND Act exempts crowdfund investing from
the registrations requirements of Section 5 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2012), and excludes
holders of crowdfunded securities from the calculation of security holders for purposes of
registration under Section 12(g) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §
781(g). See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6) & § 781(g)(6).
51

52
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track quite nicely when Congress interceded to legalize specific types of railroads
and components of their operations.
A creative marriage of social media principles and small business capital
formation tactics,'5 crowdfunding in the era preceding adoption of the
CROWDFUND Act exemplified transformative-or
transformationaltechnology: personal, consumer-driven innovation using the Internet as a
marketing, sales, and distribution tool to expand and supplement existing markets
by enhancing efficiency and decreasing costs. 5 6
[T]aking away friction and inefficiencies from the innovation
process will help facilitate the creation of more innovation....
[A]ilso, as funding innovation moves toward the logical direction
of utilizing a broader and more collective source of funds, for
example, crowdfunding, it enables a more point-and-click-style
mechanism for creating deal terms. And that's a very important
component in the scalability that any large-scale funding
mechanisms will have to possess. 57
Crowdfund investing is to capital-raising what file sharing has been to the
music industry. "[T]echnology affecting everything from the latest equipment to
file swapping and podcasting is . .. empowering people to create .... s
Before passage of the CROWDFUND Act, crowdfunding typically was
conducted through a website created to fund a specific project (e.g., a movie) or,
more commonly, a website that offered funders the opportunity to finance a
number of different business, philanthropic, or political projects or ventures.s9
Some crowdfunding websites operating before the enactment of the
CROWDFUND Act specialized in offering particular types of funding
opportunities-i.e.,
music,
art,
design, software,
social
enterprise,

See LAWTON & MAROM, supra note 51, at ix ("The crowdfunding space ... shares a lot of
social networking's energy"); Paul Belleflamme et al., Crowdfunding: Tapping the Right Crowd 2
(Apr. 25, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1578175. ("In the
case of crowdfunding, the objective is to collect money for investment; this is generally done by
using social networks, in particular through the Internet (Twitter, Facebook, Linkedin and different
other specialized blogs).").
56 See LAWTON & MAROM, supra note 51, at 53-54 (describing the transformative power of
crowdfunding as a process at the intersection of structure and chaos, and noting that "[t]he 'sweet
spot' of innovation is right at . . . the edge of chaos."); GLENN HARLAN REYNOLDS, AN ARMY OF
DAVIDS ix-xiii (2006) (illustrating the pervasive personal and economic transformations that
technology has fostered); YOUNG, supra note 52, at 49 ("Crowdfunding . . . is actually
transforming some industries and marketplaces.").
5
LAWTON & MAROM, supra note 51, at 45.
5

58 REYNOLDS, supra note 56, at 47.

See Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 53, at 963-72 (summarizing attributes of various preJOBS Act crowdfunding websites).
59
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social/community development projects, start-ups.6 0 The legal status of some
crowdfunding websites-those that might be deemed to be engaging in
crowdfund investing-was (at best) uncertain in the regulatory void.
Early in 2011, federal regulatory interest in crowdfund investing became
public record. 1 Initially a matter of regulatory relevance to the SEC,
crowdfunding became a federal legislative concern late in the summer of 2011 as
a result of a perfect storm that included (among other things) a sluggish job
market, a sparse public offering market, an elitist private offering market, a
presidential election year, and significant lobbying efforts (including those of the
emerging "crowdfunding industry"). 62 The U.S. House of Representatives passed
an early iteration of a crowdfund investing exemption in November 2011.63
Funding portals were added to the CROWDFUND Act relatively late in the
legislative process (late in March 2012), in reaction to concerns that fraud
protections in the draft text were weak.6 4
B. What is a FundingPortalunder the CROWDFUND Act?
A funding portal is a new form of securities intermediary introduced in
the CROWDFUND Act. The CROWDFUND Act delineates, in a specific
provision, the requirements for and required activities of crowdfund investing
intermediaries-both brokers and funding portals-and defines what funding
portals are.65 The statutory definition, requirements, and required activities,
together with the implementing rules adopted by the SEC, ultimately will control
what funding portals are.
But the concept of this crowdfund investing intermediary derives from the
crowdfunding websites (also commonly referenced in the literature as
crowdfunding platforms) in existence before passage of the CROWDFUND Act.
Essentially the funding portal is an Internet site that lists
crowdfunding opportunities and provides a matching service for
60

Id.
See C. Steven Bradford, The New Federal Crowdfunding Exemption: Promise Unfulfilled, 40
SEC. REG. L. J. 195, 198 (2012) [hereinafter "Bradford 11"], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
2066088; Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 53, at 882-83.
61

62

See Bradford II, supra note 61, at 198-99; Heminway & Hoffman,
supra note 53, at 883-84.

See Bradford II, supra note 61, at 199; Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 53, at 883.
64 See Stuart R. Cohn, The New Crowdfunding Registration Exemption: Good Idea, Bad
Execution, 64 FLA. L. REv. 1433, 1439 (2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2066016
("The imposition of the intermediary requirement was motivated by the concern expressed most
strongly in the Senate that a regulated intermediary is necessary to limit the potential for fraudulent
or otherwise abusive offerings."); Andrew Ackerman & Corey Boles, Senate to Add Protections to
'Jobs' Bill, WALL ST. J. (March 22, 2012, 11:07 AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB 10001424052702304636404577297432738184576.html.
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d-1(a) & 78c(a)(81) (2012).
63
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interested investors. This kind of inter-active bulletin board
service for small issuers and potential investors has been going on
for years, but now such services have an official name, a "funding
portal," a statutory definition, and an obligation to register with an
appropriate self-regulatory organization.6 6
Although the idea for funding portals in the CROWDFUND Act
undoubtedly arose from the manner in which crowdfunding organically grew
before passage of the CROWDFUND Act, the definition of a funding portal in
the CROWDFUND Act denotes attributes, responsibilities, and limitations that
are quite different from those of pre-CROWDFUND Act websites. Early
crowdfunding websites were distributional conduits, information (and, in some
cases, certification) intermediaries that typically also provided a collectivizing
function. They were a link in the distribution chain of capital from funders to
businesses or projects. In addition, they distributed financial or other benefits
from funded businesses or projects back to funders. Crowdfunding websites also
conveyed information about offering terms both to funders and to businesses and
projects seeking funding through the site. Sometimes, the crowdfunding websites
would screen and perform diligence on the businesses and projects seeking to be
funded through the site. This research and any selectivity and published guidance
arising from it centralize and aggregate the responses to actual or perceived
investor interests and needs. The reputational intermediary status of early
crowdfunding websites combined independent and dependent gatekeeper
characteristics and has not been tested over the long term.67 Crowdfunding
websites generally operated at a relatively low cost and with a relatively light
touch-investigating the projects and entities seeking funding to the extent each
deemed necessary or advisable to avoid liability and reputational damage. 6 8 The
CROWDFUND Act adds significant, mandatory burdens (and, as a result, costs)
to this organically grown model-so many burdens, that it may be difficult for
would-be funding portals to develop a profitable business model. 69
Cohn, supra note 64.
Certain longer term players, like Kickstarter and Kiva, have begun to develop the notoriety and
positive course of dealing that generate reputational intermediary status. See DON STEINBERG, THE
KICKSTARTER HANDBOOK: REAL-LIFE CROWDFUNDING SUCCESS STORIES 16 (2012) ("Because
Kickstarter has become so popular, it can bring attention to artists and entrepreneurs that goes
beyond the art or the products they offer on the site.").
68
See Ryan Calbeck, Why We are Picky: The Importance of Curation in Crowdfunding,
FORBES.COM (Nov. 20, 2012, 1:16 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ryancaldbeck/2012/11/20/
why-we-are-picky-the-importance-of-curation-in-crowdfunding/ (referring to this type of due
diligence the investigation that crowdfunding websites perform on potential issuers or projects
and their promoters-and the resulting selection process as "curation").
See generally Bradford II, supra note 61, at 222.
Congress could have used crowdfunding as an opportunity to reexamine some
of the basic premises of securities regulation of small businesses and to
66
67
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C. What Kind ofIntermediary is a FundingPortal?
Funding portals certainly are not classic distributional conduits. Unlike
the crowdfunding websites that existed before enactment of the CROWDFUND
Act, funding portals cannot accept funds from crowdfunding investors or hold
securities on their behalf.70 However, funding portals are required to ensure that
investor funds are held until the specified target amount for the offering has been
reached. It is not obvious from the statute what constitutes the "target offering
amount," but to those who have been following crowdfunding since before the
enactment of the CROWDFUND Act, it appears to be an obvious reference to a
pre-statutory crowdfunding norm. In the pre-CROWDFUND Act era, the
distribution of funds to a business or project in a crowdfunded offering typically
was contingent on the attainment of a certain threshold level of funding.72
Crowdfunding websites operating off this model collect investor funds and only
release them after that funding threshold has been reached. 3 Presumably, in
crowdfunded offerings under the CROWDFUND Act, investor funds will be held
in escrow by a third party, and funding portals under the CRO WDFUND Act will
exercise control, under the terms of an escrow agreement, over the release of
those funds.74

seriously rethink how the Internet can be used to protect investors in less
traditional, less expensive ways. Instead, it threw together a poorly drafted
regulatory bundle of old ideas that is complicated, expensive, and unlikely to
have much of an effect on the small business capital gap. There is, of course,
the possibility that a registered broker or funding portal would use
crowdfunding as a loss leader or would fund crowdfunding operations from the
profits of another business operation. The exploration of that possibility is,
however, beyond the scope of this paper.
Id.
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(8 1)(D); see also Bradford II, supra note 61, at 222.
15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(7) (2012) (requiring that crowdfunding intermediaries, including funding
portals, "ensure that all offering proceeds are only provided to the issuer when the aggregate
capital raised from all investors is equal to or greater than a target offering amount, and allow all
investors to cancel their commitments to invest, as the Commission shall, by rule, determine
appropriate").
72 See Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 53, at 900-01 ("[M]any equity-type crowdfunding
business models provide that capital will be returned if a stated funding threshold is not met"); see
also STEINBERG, supra note 67, at 13 (noting that Kickstarter, an early and continuing
crowdfunding success story, included this as a rule from its beginnings. "[C]reators had to declare
the amount they wanted to raise and set a deadline date; if the stated funding target was not
reached by the deadline, all pledges would be erased").
73 See Heminway & Hoffiman, supra note 53, at 900-01; STEINBERG, supra note 67, at 13.
74 See Bradford II, supra note 61, at 222 ("[S]ince crowdfunding intermediaries must 'ensure that
all offering proceeds are only provided to the issuer when the aggregate capital raised from all
investors is equal to or greater than a target amount,' the only effective solution is to use a third
party escrow agent to handle collection and disbursement." (footnotes omitted)).
70
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Funding portals are also information intermediaries. Under the
CROWDFUND Act, funding portals are charged with communicating certain
information to investors and the SEC and providing related support.7 1
Specifically, as crowdfunding intermediaries, funding portals must:
(3) provide such disclosures, including disclosures related to risks
and other investor education materials, as the Commission shall,
by rule, determine appropriate;
(4) ensure that each investor(A) reviews investor-education information, in accordance with
standards established by the Commission, by rule;
(B) positively affirms that the investor understands that the
investor is risking the loss of the entire investment, and that the
investor could bear such a loss; and
(C) answers questions demonstrating(i) an understanding of the level of risk generally applicable to
investments in startups, emerging businesses, and small issuers;
(ii) an understanding of the risk of illiquidity; and
(iii) an understanding of such other matters as the Commission
determines appropriate, by rule; ...
(6) not later than 21 days prior to the first day on which securities
are sold to any investor (or such other period as the Commission
may establish), make available to the Commission and to potential
investors ... information provided by the issuer. ... 76
Funding portals are also saddled with a mandatory certification function.
The CROWDFUND Act requires that funding portals, as crowdfunding
intermediaries, "take .

.

. measures to reduce the risk of fraud . . . , as established

by the Commission, by rule, including obtaining a background and securities
enforcement regulatory history check on each officer, director, and person
holding more than 20 percent of the outstanding equity of every issuer whose

75

See generally Bradford II, supranote 61, at 206-07.
Crowdfunding intermediaries must provide to potential investors any
disclosures required by the SEC, including investor education materials and
disclosures related to risks. Crowdfunding intermediaries are required to
enforce the investor education requirements discussed earlier, ensuring that
investors review the required investor-education information, answer the
required questions, and make the required affirmations about risk .

76

. .

. At least

21 days prior to the first day on which an issuer sells securities to any investor,
the crowdfunding intermediary must provide the issuer's disclosure to potential
investors.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
15 U.S.C. §§ 77d-1(a)(3), (4) & (6) (2012).
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securities are offered by such person."7 7 Moreover, funding portals are
responsible for assisting in ensuring investor compliance with the 12-month
funding limits provided for in the CROWDFUND Act.
As information intermediaries serving a certification role, funding portals
play a collectivizing role. They simplify and centralize information flow and
consolidate monitoring. Crowdfund investors are free to perform their own due
diligence on crowdfund issuers and offerings, but the CROWDFUND Act
requires funding portals to perform that function on their behalf. Service
providers are emerging to serve this important risk-reduction function.7 9
Finally, as a result of the certifying functions Congress conferred on
funding portals in the CROWDFUND Act, funding portals are reputational
intermediaries-investors may make their investment decisions in part based on
the existence and identity of the funding portal. The statute forces this role on the
funding portal in crowdfunded offerings more directly than the Securities Act of
1933, as amended, impresses reputational intermediary status on the underwriter
of registered public offerings." Funding portals, as mandatory intermediaries, are
subject to affirmative statutory due diligence requirements; public offering
underwriters, as non-mandatory intermediaries, have a statutory defense against
liability based on their due diligence." Information asymmetries should be
reduced, and due diligence costs lowered, because investors will rely upon the
presence (and, as market experience accumulates, the reputation) of the funding
portal.
As reputational intermediaries, funding portals share many characteristics
with securities underwriters, which have attributes of both independent and
dependent gatekeepers. The CROWDFUND Act requires that funding portals
perform due diligence and consolidate information flow in a context similar to the
setting in which underwriters perform those functions in a registered public
Id. § 77d-1(a)(5); see also Bradford 11, supra note 61, at 207.
15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(8); see also Bradford II, supra note 61, at 206.
See, e.g., Service, crowdcheck.com, www.crowdcheck.com/services (Apr. 7, 2013, 11:00 AM).
80 See Laby, supra note 32, at 132 ("Section 11 of the Securities Act names the underwriter ... as
a potential defendant in a private lawsuit if a registration statement is misleading. Section 11 also
provides a due diligence defense to the underwriter, who must undertake a 'reasonable
investigation' to assure itself that statements made in the registration statement are true."); Leahy,
supra note 28, at 418 (describing this mandatory relationship between underwriters and Section 11
of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, as a myth).
81 Compare 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(3) (requiring compliance with as-yet-unwritten SEC disclosure
rules) with id. § 77k(b)(3)(A) (allowing potentially liable persons, including public offering
underwriters, a defense against misstatement and omission liability for unexpertized portions of
effective registration statements under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, for reasonable
belief based on reasonable investigation). See also id. § 77k(b)(3)(C) (establishing a defense for
underwriters against misstatement and omission liability for reasonable belief as to the accuracy
and completeness of expertized portions of an effective registration statement under the Securities
Act of 1933, as amended, but not expressly (but may impliedly) requiring diligence).
77
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offering. Also, although the CROWDFUND Act does not mandate this result, it
seems that issuers will retain the services of funding portals as crowdfund
investing intermediaries, creating at least a contractual, if not a financial,
dependency relationship between funding portals and issuers.
Yet funding portals are less dependent on issuers than securities
underwriters. Funding portals do not and cannot do certain things that securities
underwriters routinely do. Specifically, under the CROWDFUND Act, funding
portals cannot "offer investment advice or recommendations," 8 3 "Solicit
purchases, sales, or offers to buy the securities offered or displayed on its website
or portal,"8 4 "compensate employees, agents, or other persons for such
solicitation or based on the sale of securities displayed or referenced on its
website or portal,"ss or "hold, manage, possess, or otherwise handle investor
funds or securities."8 ' The inability of funding portals to engage in these activities
distances them from issuers and investors. Securities underwriters act as advisors,
solicit investments (and compensate employees and agents to do the same), and
may hold both investor funds and securities in their role as conduit
intermediaries.
D. PreliminaryObservationsArising Out of the IntermediaryStatus of
Funding Portals

Funding portals are crowdfund investing intermediaries on steroids.
While they are not conventional distributional conduits, they are information
intermediaries-specifically
certification intermediaries-that perform a
collectivizing function. They also are independent gatekeepers because they are

The Interim Form for Funding Portals posted on the website for the Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority ("FINRA") includes requests for information about the business model and
fee structure of the funding portal (denominated "FP" in the form). See Fin. Industry Reg. Auth.,
Interim Form for Funding Portals, http://www.finra.org/Industry/Issues/Crowdfunding/ (e.g.,
"Please describe the FP's business model (e.g., the types of securities to be presented to investors,
any limitations on the types of issuers, how issuers will be presented to investors)" and "Please
describe the forms and sources of compensation that the FP and persons associated with the FP
expect to receive (e.g., transaction-based, referral-based, flat fee , from issuers, from investors)");
see also Laby, supra note 32, at 132-33 (noting the issuer's retention of an underwriter as an aspect
of dependence).
83
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(81)(A) (2012); see also Bradford II, supra note 61, at 220-21 (critiquing
this aspect of the CROWDFUND Act).
84
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(81)(B); see also Bradford II, supra note 61, at 221 ("Read literally, this
could prevent funding portals from operating crowdfunding sites at all, since issuers' listings on
crowdfunding sites are soliciting purchases and offers to buy the issuers' securities.").
85 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(81)(C).
Id. § 78c(a)(81)(D).
87
See supra note 14 and accompanying text; Laby, supra note 32, at 132-33 (noting an
underwriter's advisory and distribution promotion functions).
82
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certifying reputational intermediaries that are "independent of the client, acting as
a neutral umpire"" rather than "dependent on the client, charged with promoting
the client's ends in a fiduciary or similar capacity."8 9 Having categorized funding
portals in this manner, certain preliminary observations seem appropriate, even in
the absence of the long-awaited SEC enabling regulations (which, no doubt, will
add significant content to the provisions in the CROWDFUND Act). Prior
research on intermediary status offers some insights about securities
intermediaries with the attributes described supra Part II.C that are likely to be
important to funding portal regulation regardless of the content of the SEC's
regulations.

1. Conflicting Interests
Conflicting interests usually top the list of concerns in the securities
intermediary context. 90 The nature of the intermediary's compensation and the
potential effects of cross-subsidies may incentivize intermediaries to selectively
report information to the market. Significant regulation (including recent
regulation of public accountants) exists to prevent conflicting interests from
impinging on the policies underlying the federal securities laws. 9 1
The CROWDFUND Act attempts to curb the potential for conflicting
interests in funding portal intermediation by defining the operations of funding
portals narrowly. Advisory, solicitation, and conduit activities are proscribed.92 In
addition, a funding portal must "prohibit its directors, officers, or partners (or any

88 Laby, supra note 32, at 120.
89 Id.

See, e.g., Choi 1, supra note 11, at 51 ("Certainly, conflicts of interest pose an identifiable
problem within the securities intermediary market."); Choi & Fisch, supra note 23, at 273
("[M]any of the problems with intermediary performance can be traced to conflicts of interest").
91 See, e.g., Choi & Fisch, supra note 23, at 274 ("The National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD) and the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) have . . . implemented conflict-of-interest
rules designed to increase the independence of analysts. Similarly, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
forbids outside auditors from providing a wide range of consulting services to their audit clients.");
Leahy, supra note 28, at 419 ("The broker-dealer industry's self-regulatory agency ... already has
regulations in place that require the participation of a 'qualified independent underwriter' in due
diligence in limited circumstances where underwriters are deemed to have a 'conflict of
interest."'); Jeffrey Manns, Rating Risk After the Subprime Mortgage Crisis:A User Fee Approach
for Rating Agency Accountability, 87 N.C.L. REv. 1011, 1052-53 (2009) ("The Sarbanes-Oxley
Act recognized how the allure of consulting fees on top of accounting fees could ensnare
accountants in conflicts of interests with their clients and therefore abolished these potential side
payoffs." (footnote omitted)); Orcutt, supra note 2, at 896 ("One of the purposes of the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002 ... was to address ... financial intermediary conflicts of interest.").
92 See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(81)(A)-(D) (2012); see also supra text accompanying notes 83-86.
90
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person occupying a similar status or performing a similar function) from having
any financial interest in an issuer using its services."9'
Although the statutory restrictions on advisory, solicitation, conduit, and
affiliate financial interests may constrain wrongful conduct by cutting off
potential sources of conflicting interests, they also may cause collateral damage
to the market for funding portals. Specifically, these restrictions on the potential
self-dealing activities of funding portals foreclose potential revenue sources that
funding portals might otherwise have used to finance their activities.94
Eliminating intermediary conflicts is a flawed solution . . . .
Someone has to pay for intermediary services, and eliminating
conflicts may block an important source of financing. We argue
that existing intermediary conflicts have arisen, in large part,
because intermediary services are not self-supporting. Regulations
that force the separation of intermediary services from more
lucrative services may reduce or eliminate services that are not
independently profitable and may thus actually exacerbate
existing shortages of intermediary services. In particular, although
intermediaries presently provide information and technical
support, their provision of more active services . . . has been

limited.95
Accordingly, the U.S. Congress, while meaning well, may have crippled
the small business financing tool it sought to create in the CROWDFUND Act by
pricing funding portals out of the market. In some cases, brokers may benefit
from the imposition of these transaction costs on funding portals, since brokers
can also serve as crowdfund investing intermediaries under the CROWDFUND
Act 9 6 and they are not subject to all of the same operating restrictions that are
imposed on funding portals. Brokers should be able to perform more services
for issuers and investors on a cost-effective basis and may therefore become
important to establishing a crowdfund investing market. However, if brokers
opting to serve as crowdfunding intermediaries cannot meet the aggregate
demand for intermediary services that arises in crowdfunded offerings under the
CROWDFUND Act, the operating constraints imposed on funding portals may
negatively impact the development and growth of the crowdfund investing
market.

"Id. § 77d-1I(a)(1 1).
See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
Choi & Fisch, supra note 23, at 274-75.
15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(1)(A).
9
See Bradford II, supra note 61, at 221-22 (describing advantages brokers may enjoy as
crowdfunding intermediaries under the provisions in the CROWDFUND Act).
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2. Fiduciary Duties
Securities intermediaries may have fiduciary duties based on their role as
agents or actors in an agency-like relationship. 98 Dependent gatekeepers, for
example, are usually fiduciaries.9 9 Fiduciary duties typically include a duty of
loyalty (which may involve, for example, avoiding conflicting interests-as
discussed above-or usurping the principal's opportunities) and a duty of
performance (which includes acting in accordance with a defined standard of
care, among other things). 100 In contrast, as previously noted, the Trust Indenture
Act does not impose extra-contractual fiduciary duties on indenture trustees until
after there is a default on debt repayment. o0
The CROWDFUND Act does not expressly impose fiduciary duties on
funding portals. However, the SEC has broad authority under the CROWDFUND
Act and the securities laws in general to promulgate rules and regulations. 10 2
There has been speculation about whether the SEC may, in fact, impose a
fiduciary duty to investors on funding portals. 103 This could be done through rule
making or through enforcement or amicus activity. In addition, in the absence of
statutory or regulatory guidance to the contrary, fiduciary duties under agency
law would apply to the extent that funding portals are agents of issuers under
common law principles of agency.
Certainly, funding portals have an investor protection function under the
CROWDFUND Act. Funding portals have mandated tasks that impress them into
serving investor interests, including providing risk disclosures and investor
education materials, obtaining certain investor assurances regarding those risks
and education materials, taking fraud-reduction measures, and taking steps to
ensure the privacy of investor information.104 The status of funding portals as
reputational intermediaries imbues them with trust attributes. Also, securities
E.g., Laby, supra note 32, at 133 ("[S]ome courts have begun to recognize a fiduciary
relationship between an underwriter and an issuer.").
99 See id. at 120 (observing that dependent gatekeepers are "charged with promoting the client's
ends in a fiduciary or similar capacity").
100 See Deborah A. DeMott, Disloyal Agents, 58 ALA. L.
REV. 1049, 1052-53 (2007).
101 See supra note 21 and accompanying
text.
102 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d-1(a)(12) & (c) (2012), 77s,
78c(a)(81)(E), 78w(a)(1).
103 See, e.g., Adrienne Burke, Questions Remain About Equity
Crowdfunding Rules, SMALLBIz
VoTE (Nov. 16, 2012, 6:13 PM), http://smallbusiness.yahoo.com/advisor/ blogs/smallbizvote/questions-remain-equity-crowdfunding-rules-23 1339623.html
(noting the
issue and
expressing hope that fiduciary duties will not be imposed on funding portals); Craig Denlinger,
Speculation on New SEC Chairman'sImplications to Crowdfunding, CROWDFUND CPA (Nov. 30,
2012),
http://crowdfundepa.com/blog--industry-insights.html?goback=%/2Egde 4382493
member_191331770 (speculating, based on comments made in a 2009 law review article, that
current SEC Chairman Elisse Walter would support imposing fiduciary duties on, among other
intermediaries, funding portals).
104 See 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(3)-(5)
& (9).
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underwriters, close cousins to funding portals in a number of respects, have
sometimes been charged with fiduciary obligations to public offering investors.os
However, the significant statutory requirements applicable to funding portals and
their more independent status takes them further away from a traditional agency
relationship than public underwriters. The application of fiduciary duties to the
activities of funding portals is, at this juncture, unsettled and uncertain.
The existence of undefined funding portal fiduciary duties and
uncertainty around their possible application may impose costs on funding
portals. Ostensibly these costs will be taken into account by those considering
registration as funding portals. In the absence of SEC regulations or guidance on
this issue, the nature and amount of these costs are unknown and difficult to
isolate and gauge. If crowdfund investing under the CROWDFUND Act is to be
viable, the SEC should directly address whether funding portals have fiduciary or
other duties to investors (or, for that matter, duties to issuers who entrust funding
portals with information).
3. Cognitive Biases
Securities intermediaries-especially dependent intermediaries that serve
as gatekeepers-may exhibit cognitive biases that impact their ability to
successfully carry out their conduit, information, collectivizing, and reputational
10
roles.o
These biases may reflect individualized objectives and processes.107
Among other things, decision-making shortcuts (heuristics) may present
challenges to unbiased decision making by intermediaries. 0 8

See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, Beyond Liability: Rewarding Effective Gatekeepers, 92
MINN. L. REV. 323, 350 (2007) ("[G]atekeepers may succumb to biases and use heuristics that
prevent exercising best judgment."); Laby, supra note 32, at 121 ("[D]ependent gatekeepers, far
more than independent ones, perform their responsibilities under the yoke of unconscious bias that
affects the rigor they bring to the gatekeeping task and the accuracy of their judgments."); Troy A.
Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and its Consequences for Securities
Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 417, 455 (2003) ("A vast behavioral finance literature suggests that
securities market professionals, like lay investors, are subject to all sorts of cognitive biases that
affect investment decisions."); Robert A. Prentice, Moral Equilibrium: Stock Brokers and the
Limits of Disclosure, 2011 Wis. L. REV. 1059, 1088-89 ("Evidence demonstrates that the selfserving bias affects virtually every category of professional, including lawyers, . . . auditors,
investment bankers, securities analysts, . . . and, of course, stock brokers." (footnotes omitted)).
107 See Laby, supra note 32, at 138 ("Social psychology teaches that goals and motives influence
reasoning the way people process information-and the judgments they make. Motives affect
reasoning by inducing people to rely on a biased set of cognitive processes that reflect the goals we
seek to achieve. Cognitive processes that can become corrupted include the way one accesses
information and the way one constructs and evaluates beliefs (footnotes omitted)).
1os See id at 139; Cunningham, supra note 106, at 350.
105
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Among numerous examples are the self-serving bias and the
commitment bias, which can afflict auditors, lawyers, and other
gatekeepers. The first refers to a tendency to interpret data and
assess uncertainty according to one's own self-interest. The
second refers to a tendency to continue to believe positions one
already has taken, which can induce continued confidence in
mistaken beliefs instead of corrections using new information.109
A securities transaction gatekeeper also may exhibit bias favoring its
client.11 0 In general, biases and heuristics emanate from, and vary with, structural
considerations (i.e., the intermediary's place in a specific type of transactional
structure) or an individual transaction's factual context.'11
Funding portals, like other securities intermediaries, may be subject to
cognitive biases that impact their ability to conduct the activities they are required
to undertake. However, the currently underdeveloped regulatory framework with
respect to funding portals and crowdfund investing generally makes it difficult to
judge whether funding portal decision making may reflect biases favoring issuers
or investors. If funding portals are retained and compensated by issuers and also
owe duties (fiduciary and other) to both issuers and investors, funding portals
may find themselves serving two masters. In this environment, the assessment of
and reaction to client-favoring bias becomes complex, and therefore costly. A
legal or regulatory response to actual or foreseeable cognitive biases further adds
to transaction costs. 1 12
It also is worth noting, in passing, that crowdfunding intermediaries may
encourage or expose investor cognitive biases. The mere existence of funding
portals and brokers as certification and reputational intermediaries under the
CROWDFUND Act may lull investors into a submissive, passive, risk-preferring
role in crowdfund investing. This investor reaction may have perverse regulatory
implications.

Cunningham, supra note 106, at 350-51.
110 See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Chasing the GreasedPig Down Wall Street: A Gatekeeper's
Guide to the Psychology, Culture, and Ethics ofFinancialRisk Taking, 96 CORNELL L. REv. 1209,
1244-45 (2011) ("Psychological research has found evidence that auditors, for example, are prone
to motivated inference-supporting management in the exercise of accounting judgments-even
109

after the formal conflicts of interest . . . are removed.").

III See Richard W. Painter, Convergence and Competition in Rules Governing Lawyers and
Auditors, 29 IOWA J. CORP. L. 397, 415 (2004) ("Cognitive biases . . . are similar to agency
problems in that they vary with the role of individual decisionmakers . . . . A solution to a

cognitive bias that works for ... one gatekeeper, may not work for another.").
112 See Andrew S. Gold, On the Elimination of Fiduciary Duties: A Theory of Good Faithfor
UnincorporatedFirms, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 123, 181 n.302 (2006) ("[T]he mere existence of
cognitive bias does not mean that paternalism is the appropriate response. The costs of paternalism
must be a factor.").

Ed. 2]

The New Intermediary on the Block

201

Investors that come to believe they are protected through
regulation
may choose (either rationally or perhaps
overoptimistically) to take greater risks with their investment
dollars and take fewer precautions. As a result, regulatory
protections for such investors become self-justifying. Once
market-based institutions are displaced, they may have a difficult
time regenerating. In the absence of market-based institutions,
staying with status quo regulation may then maximize investor
welfare (even if the initial displacement of the market did not). 113
This possible investor risk-taking is not specific to the intermediary status
of funding portals. Rather, it is a potential general behavioral reaction to the
existence of investor protection regulation. 14
4. Securities Fraud Liability
Securities intermediaries are subject to various types of statutory,
regulatory, and common law liability depending on their functional role."' This
liability may include fraud and misstatements liability as well as liability for
noncompliance with duties or other obligations imposed under applicable law or
regulation.1 6 The CROWDFUND Act expressly imposes statutory liability on
crowdfunding issuers but is silent on the liability of funding portals (except to

Choi I, supra note 22, at 69.
See Oskari Juurikkala, The BehavioralParadox: Why Investor IrrationalityCalls for Lighter
and Simpler FinancialRegulation, 18 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 33, 82 (2012) ("[P]rotective
regulatory schemes may create an illusion of security and safety, thereby encouraging
overoptimism bias among market participants. Regulation may lead investors to rely too much on
public protection, and their attempts to make wise choices-and overcome their own behavioral
biases-are weakened as a result."); Henry T.C. Hu, Faith and Magic: Investor Beliefs and
Government Neutrality, 78 TEX. L. REV. 777, 780 (2000) ("[T]he distorted demand for equities
stems from a misplaced or if not misplaced, socially undesirable-optimism on the part of
investors about the federal government's willingness and ability to prevent a crash or ameliorate its
effects.").
115 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Federal Corporate Law: Lessons from
History, 106 COLuM. L. REV. 1793, 1820 (2006) ("Federal securities laws subject a variety of
gatekeepers to liability for failure to prevent issuer fraud."); Lawrence A. Cunningham, supra, note
106, at 338 ("Securities professionals are responsible for approving transactions, designing or
opining on them or related disclosure, and providing assurance and attestation of financial
statement assertions. Failure to perform these duties triggers liability under various state and
federal claims, a panoply of SEC administrative sanctions, and criminal action.").
116 See, e.g., Poonam Puri, Taking Stock of Taking Stock, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 99, 147-52 (2001)
(outlining various different ways in which lawyers, as securities gatekeepers, may be secondarily
liable for or in connection with their activities).
113
114
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clarify that state securities commissions retain enforcement authority over actions
against, among others, funding portals)." 7
In the United States, securities fraud often is punished under Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended,"' and Rule lOb-5
adopted by the SEC under Section 10(b).11 9 Liability under these provisions is
premised on manipulation or deception (including through misstatements of
material fact and misleading omissions) with scienter in connection with a
purchase or sale of securities. 12 0 Decisional law under Section 10(b) and Rule
1Ob-5 does not recognize aiding and abetting liability.121 Securities intermediaries
typically are not primary actors (buyers or sellers) in securities transactions, and
they do not normally have primary disclosure obligations, except with respect to
their own transactional services and compensation. As a result, under applicable
case law, we would expect that funding portals would rarely be liable for
securities fraud.
However, the CROWDFUND Act requires funding portals to be primary
actors in certain respects. For example, the statute requires funding portals to
"provide such disclosures, including disclosures related to risks and other investor
education materials, as the Commission shall, by rule, determine appropriate."122
Accordingly, funding portals may face securities fraud liability under Section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5 for misstatements and misleading omissions in these
disclosures, and for any other actions they take with the requisite scienter, that
constitute manipulation or deception in connection with the purchase or sale of a
security.
In addition, there is some concern that funding portals may be subject to
liability as sellers under Section 12(a)(2) of the 1933 Actl23 or even as issuers
under the new misstatements and omissions cause of action created under the
See 15 U.S.C. § 77d- 1(c) (2012) (providing for crowdfunding issuer liability akin to that under
Section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended); id. § 77r(c)(1)(B) (preserving state
securities commission investigations and causes of action for fraud, deceit, and unlawful conduct
by brokers, dealers, funding portals, and issuers in connection with crowdfunded securities
offerings); see also Bradford 11, supra note 61, at 209-10.
..
s Id. §78j(b).
119 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012).
120 See Joan MacLeod Heminway, Martha Stewart Saved! Insider Violations
of Rule 10b-5 for
Misrepresentedor Undisclosed PersonalFacts, 65 MD. L. REv. 380, 382-90 (2006) (summarizing
the law in this area).
121 Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 153 (2008) (finding no
liability because investors did not rely on the defendant's statements or representations); Cent.
Bank, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994) ("Because the text of § 10(b)
does not prohibit aiding and abetting, we hold that a private plaintiff may not maintain an aiding
and abetting suit under § 10(b)."); see Jennifer J. Johnson, Secondary Liability for Securities
Fraud: Gatekeepers in State Court, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 463, 465 (2011).
122 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(3).
123 Id. § 771(a)(2).
117
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CROWDFUND Act. 12 4 A full analysis of these issues is beyond the scope of this
paper. A brief summary is, however, both appropriate and helpful.
Section 12(a)(2) allows a purchaser of securities to bring a legal action
against the seller for rescission or, in certain circumstances, damages for material
misstatements and omissions to state material fact in securities offering
prospectuses. The concept of a "seller" under Section 12 of the 1933 Act is a bit
squirrely and may encompass intermediaries. 125 The leading Supreme Court case,
decided under Section 12(a)(1) of the 1933 Act,126 connects the potential for
liability to (among other things) the intermediary's status as an agent of the
issuer. 12 7 As noted supra Part II.D.2 in the context of fiduciary duty, however, the
agency status of funding portals is unclear. The Court also stated that "[t]he
language and purpose of § 12(1) suggest that liability extends only to the person
who successfully solicits the purchase, motivated at least in part by a desire to
serve his own financial interests or those of the securities owner." 12 8 Although
funding portals are not permitted to solicit investments under the CROWDFUND
Act, 12 9 they have disclosure and due diligence responsibilities, host the
crowdfunded offering as an integral part of the issuer's solicitation process, and
likely will be paid by the issuer to conduct their activities (suggesting the
possibility of financial motivation). The allegiance of funding portals is,
therefore, somewhat split between issuers and investors, making their status as
sellers uncertain.
The unclear nature of a Section 12(a)(2) cause of action in the
crowdfunding context extends beyond the inexact notion of a "seller," however.
The term "prospectus" also creates uncertainties in the application of Section
12(a)(2) outside the public offering context.13 0 Prior decisional law has not simply
relied on the definition of "prospectus" under the 1933 Act to construe the
meaning of "prospectus" for Section 12(a)(2) purposes."' The meaning of
124

Id. § 77d-1(c).

See Johnson, supra note 121, at 481 ("[T]o the extent broker-dealers or issuer- employees
solicit purchases or sales, they too are deemed 'sellers' under the Pinter definition"); Puri, supra
note 116, at 150-51 ("[A]n underwriter, lawyer, accountant, or outside director who in any way
solicits a purchase can be subject to section 12(a)(1) liability.... [I]t is not unreasonable to expect
that gatekeepers can potentially face liability under section 12(a)(2) as well.").
125

126
127

15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(1).

Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 646 (1988) ("It long has been 'quite clear,' that when a broker
acting as agent of one of the principals to the transaction successfully solicits a purchase, he is a
person from whom the buyer purchases within the meaning of § 12 and is therefore liable as a
statutory seller.").
128 Id. at
647.
129 See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
130 See generally Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561 (1995)
(construing whether a stock
purchase agreement is a "prospectus" under Section 12(a)(2) of the 1933 Act).
131 Id. at 568-73 (using Section 10, rather than Section 2(a)(10), of the 1933 Act to establish the
meaning of "prospectus" under Section 12(a)(2)).
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"prospectus" in the context of a crowdfunded offering of securities remains to be
seen, but it is possible that crowdfunding websites or other communications made
by or on behalf of funding portals may constitute prospectuses under Section
12(a)(2).'132
The CROWDFUND Act amends the 1933 Act to create a new Section
12(a)(2)-like cause of action against issuers who sell securities under the
crowdfunding exemption.133 The term "issuer" is broadly and vaguely defined in
Section 2(a)(4) of the 1933 Act to include "every person who issues or proposes
to issue any security."1 34 There is a possibility that funding portals may be
considered to be issuers for these purposes.135
Each of these securities liability questions in the brave new world of
crowdfunded securities offerings begs for clarification through SEC regulation or
guidance. It is possible that the forthcoming SEC regulations will respond to the
need for more clarity in this area. In the interim, however, the actual and
uncertain potential for securities fraud liability exposure represents an additional
cost of doing business for funding portals. 13 6

III. CONCLUSION
This paper presents various definitions of an intermediary and taxonomies
of intermediaries, describes funding portals (as we now know them), locates
funding portals in existing definitional and taxonomical constructs, and offers
related preliminary observations about issues that potentially impact funding
portals in crowdfunded offerings of securities. The picture of funding portals
under the CROWDFUND Act is not yet complete (due to delays in the SEC
rulemaking process necessary to implementation of the CROWDFUND Act).
However, the CROWDFUND Act supplies information about funding portals as
securities intermediaries sufficient to enable an initial assessment of several
matters important to funding portal regulation.
132 See generally Thomas Lee Hazen, Crowdfunding or Fraudfunding?Social Networks and the
Securities Laws-Why the Specially Tailored Exemption Must Be Conditioned on Meaningful
Disclosure, 90 N.C.L. REV. 1735, 1758-59 (2012) (discussing the prospectus requirement in
Section 12(a)(2) actions).
13
15 U.S.C. §77d-1(c) (2012).
134 Id. § 77b(a)(4). This definition is enhanced in the CROWDFUND Act for use in the context of
the new cause of action to include certain enumerated principals of the issuer, including its
principal executive, financial, and accounting officers. See id. § 77d-1(c)(3).
135 Cf Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 53, at 923-24 (discussing the possibility that
crowdfunding websites, in the pre-CROWDFUND Act era, may be co-issuers under Section 5 of
the 1933 Act).
136 See Hamdani, supra note 43, at 60 (observing that "the fee hike triggered by gatekeeper
liability may turn out to have negative consequences"); Celia R. Taylor, Breaking the Bank:
Reconsidering Central Bank of Denver after Enron and Sarbanes-Oxley, 71 Mo. L. REV. 367, 389
(2006) (noting that gatekeepers build this uncertainty cost into their fees).
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Funding portals have attributes common to many other securities
intermediaries but are a unique creation of the CROWDFUND Act. Depending
on the context in which an evaluation is being made, a funding portal can be
classified as an information, certification, collectivizing, or reputational
intermediary. Intermediaries of these kinds routinely engage certain issues,
including conflicting interests, fiduciary duties, cognitive biases, and gatekeeper
liability. Even a brief depiction of these topics reveals that it may be costly to be a
funding portal. The combined attributes assigned to funding portals in the
CROWDFUND Act, when viewed in their actual and anticipated regulatory
context, may very well be so burdensome and costly that they discourage the
development and registration of funding portals.
In sum, it is unclear whether the intermediation of crowdfund investing
will provide better investor protection at a manageable cost. Many details remain
to be addressed, and their inter-relation with statutory mandates, regulatory
prescriptions, proscriptions, and guidance, and decisional law creates significant
uncertainty. Only time, allowing for an evaluation of the SEC's crowdfund
investing rules and the crowdfunded offerings conducted under those rules, will
tell.

